

**BEFORE THE
ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION**

DOCKET NO. 03-0596

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF

GARY J. BALL

ON BEHALF OF

**AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF ILLINOIS, COVAD COMMUNICATIONS
COMPANY, WORLDCOM, INC. D/B/A MCI, ACCESS ONE, INC., CIMCO
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., FOCAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, FORTE
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., GLOBALCOM, INC., MPOWER COMMUNICATIONS,
XO ILLINOIS, INC., TDS METROCOM, LLC, and MCLEODUSA
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC.**

Regarding Dedicated Transport and High Capacity Loops

JOINT CLEC EXHIBIT 2.0

February 4, 2004

03-0596
Joint CLEC Exhibit No. 2.0
Date 2/26/04 [Signature]

1 **I. INTRODUCTION OF WITNESS AND PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY.**

2 **Q1. PLEASE STATE YOUR FULL NAME, TITLE AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

3 A1. My name is Gary J. Ball. I am an independent consultant providing analysis of
4 regulatory issues and testimony for telecommunications companies. My business address
5 is 47 Peaceable Street, Ridgefield, Connecticut 06877.

6 **Q2. DID YOU PREVIOUSLY SUBMIT DIRECT TESTIMONY IN THIS**
7 **PROCEEDING?**

8 A2. Yes, I previously submitted direct testimony on behalf of a number of competitive local
9 exchange carriers ("CLECs") identified in that testimony. A summary of my education
10 background and professional experience is provided in Part I of my direct testimony.

11 **Q3. ON WHOSE BEHALF IS YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY PRESENTED?**

12 A3. I am submitting this rebuttal testimony on behalf of the following CLECs: AT&T
13 Communications of Illinois, Inc, Covad Communications Company, Access One, Inc.,
14 CIMCO Communications, Inc., Focal Communications Corporation, Forte
15 Communications, Inc., Globalcom, Inc., Mpower Communications, XO Illinois, Inc.,
16 TDS Metrocom, LLC, McLeodUSA Telecommunications Services, Inc. and WorldCom,
17 Inc. d/b/a MCI. These are the same CLECs on whose behalf I submitted direct
18 testimony.

19 **Q4. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

20 A4. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to a number of points raised in the
21 direct testimonies of Illinois Commerce Commission Staff witnesses Qin Liu and Genio
22 Staranczak with respect to their review of SBC's requests for non-impairment findings
23 for various dedicated transport routes and enterprise customer locations.

24 **Q5. HOW IS YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?**

25 A5. My rebuttal testimony is divided into six sections. Section I identifies the general scope
26 and purpose of my rebuttal testimony. In Section II, I will explain the importance of
27 ensuring that the burden of proof for both the self-provisioning trigger and wholesale
28 trigger for both dedicated transport and enterprise customer loops is met by SBC, and
29 how the Staff approaches to both the triggers and the potential deployment analysis
30 inappropriately shift the burden to CLECs, who would be placed in the impossible
31 position of having to disprove the existence of other carriers' services or facilities. In
32 Section III, I will explain how Dr. Liu's proposal to allow SBC to include switched
33 transport routes in determining whether the triggers for dedicated transport have been met
34 is erroneous and inconsistent with the FCC's definition of dedicated transport in the
35 Triennial Review Order ("TRO"). I will also provide a more thorough explanation of the
36 differences between dedicated transport and switched transport. In Section IV, I will
37 explain how the FCC's impairment analysis in the TRO requires that OC(n) level
38 services be treated as distinct services from DS3, DS1, and dark fiber, and that the basis
39 of the FCC's impairment analysis would be undermined if OC(n) level services were
40 assumed to provide DS3s and DS1s. In Section V, I will explain how CLECs must have
41 access to an entire building before the self-provisioning trigger for enterprise loops can
42 be met with respect to that building. Finally, in Section VI, I will explain how Dr.
43 Staranczak's proposed modification of SBC's potential deployment analysis for
44 enterprise loops does not cure the fundamental flaw inherent in that analysis; namely, that
45 it does not require the necessary building-specific analysis required by the FCC.

46 **II. THE STAFF APPROACHES TO THE TRIGGERS WOULD INAPPROPRIATELY**
47 **SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF AWAY FROM SBC AND ONTO THE CLECS.**

48 **Q6. ON PAGE 23 OF HER TESTIMONY ON LOOPS, STAFF WITNESS DR. QIN**
49 **LIU RECOMMENDS A "PROVISIONAL" FINDING OF NON-IMPAIRMENT**
50 **WITH RESPECT TO 122 LOOP LOCATIONS WHERE SBC HAS ASSUMED**
51 **THE PRESENCE OF DARK FIBER FROM THE EXISTENCE OF FIBER**
52 **FACILITIES, LEAVING IT TO CLECS TO COME FORWARD WITH**
53 **EVIDENCE TO PROVE OTHERWISE. DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS**
54 **APPROACH?**

55 A6. No. Dr. Liu refers to SBC's "assumption" that the existence of fiber facilities implies
56 that dark fiber is deployed, an assumption which she views as "reasonable," and on that
57 basis would require affirmative evidence from CLECs of the negative – that dark fiber is
58 not present. A similar suggestion is made by Staff witness Dr. Staranczak at pages 16-17
59 of his testimony where he indicates that 100 buildings from SBC's "potential
60 deployment" list should receive non-impairment findings unless CLECs can provide
61 specific information about any of these buildings to show that the FCC's criteria for
62 potential deployment are not met. In my view, these recommendations are directly
63 contrary to the TRO in that they would allow SBC to rely on presumptions rather than
64 evidence and would effectively shift the burden of showing non-impairment away from
65 the ILEC.

66 **Q7. PLEASE DESCRIBE WHY IT IS NECESSARY FOR SBC TO BEAR THE**
67 **BURDEN OF PROOF TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIGGERS HAVE**
68 **BEEN MET TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF NON-IMPAIRMENT WITH**
69 **RESPECT TO DEDICATED TRANSPORT ROUTES AND ENTERPRISE**
70 **CUSTOMER LOOPS?**

71 A7. It is important to remember that the starting point for this proceeding is the FCC's
72 national finding of impairment for loops and dedicated transport at the DS3, DS1, and
73 dark fiber capacity levels. The FCC has given ILECs the opportunity to propose specific
74 locations and routes for which the ILEC believes sufficient services are being offered or

75 provided by CLECs or other carriers such that CLECs will not be impaired at the
76 requisite capacity levels if the ILEC is not required to offer loops or transport as a UNE
77 at those locations or on those routes. SBC has taken this opportunity, claiming that a
78 large number of buildings and dedicated transport routes in Illinois meet either the
79 triggers or the potential deployment criteria. As the entity seeking to obtain findings of
80 non-impairment for specific transport routes and building locations to override the FCC's
81 national finding of impairment, SBC should be the one required to provide sufficient
82 evidence consistent with the FCC's requirements to support a finding of non-impairment
83 by the Commission with respect to each building location or transport route for which
84 SBC asserts that the triggers or the potential deployment criteria are met.

85 **Q8. HAS SBC MET THIS BURDEN IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

86 A8. No. As Dr. Liu correctly points out in both her loops and transport testimony, SBC has
87 not provided the necessary information required by the TRO to demonstrate that the
88 provisions of the triggers have been met for most of the buildings and routes in its filing.
89 Instead of identifying specific buildings and routes for which CLECs or other carriers
90 actually acknowledge or otherwise can be documented as providing service at the
91 relevant capacity levels, SBC took a much more "liberal" approach, relying upon
92 assumptions and presumptions about what SBC believes are the potential capabilities of
93 CLEC networks. The result is a vastly larger list of buildings and routes and one that is
94 unsubstantiated in terms of meeting the FCC's trigger requirements.

95 **Q9. PLEASE DESCRIBE WHAT YOU MEAN WHEN YOU SAY THAT SBC BASED**
96 **ITS FILING UPON ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES**
97 **OF CLEC NETWORKS.**

98 A9. SBC made several broad assumptions about the potential capabilities of CLEC networks,
99 and used those assumptions as its primary evidence to support the triggers. For example,
100 Section III of this testimony discusses the error of assuming that a transport route that
101 traverses a CLEC switch (i.e., switched transport) can be counted as dedicated transport.
102 This approach is an example of what I referred to in my direct testimony as SBC's
103 "connect the dots" approach, in which any two collocations of a CLEC in SBC central
104 offices are automatically assumed to be end points of a transport route. Similarly,
105 Section IV of this testimony discusses SBC's assumption that any fiber optic facility
106 should be counted as capable and operationally ready to provide any level of service,
107 including DS1 and DS3.

108 **Q10. DOES THE TRO SUPPORT A "SHOWING" OF NO IMPAIRMENT BASED**
109 **UPON THESE SORT OF BROAD ASSUMPTIONS?**

110 A10. No. The TRO provides only two alternatives for demonstrating lack of impairment: the
111 true self-provisioning and wholesale triggers, and the potential deployment analysis. If
112 SBC cannot demonstrate with respect to a particular route or enterprise customer location
113 that the necessary numbers of CLECs or other carriers are providing the service at the
114 requisite capacity levels, the only other recourse for SBC is to attempt to prove that the
115 location or route meets the potential deployment test. The FCC's potential deployment
116 test provides a more extensive set of requirements than the triggers, in that it requires
117 both a validation that the location or route can accommodate multiple competitive supply,
118 and an economic analysis to compare the potential revenues and costs of each building or
119 route.

120 **Q11. BASED UPON YOUR REVIEW OF THE CLECS' DATA RESPONSES, DO YOU**
121 **AGREE WITH DR. LIU'S IMPLICATION AT PAGE 24 OF HER LOOPS**
122 **TESTIMONY AND PAGE 40 OF HER TRANSPORT TESTIMONY THAT THE**
123 **CLECS HAVE NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING DATA TO SBC**
124 **WHEN ASKED?**

125 A11. No, Based upon my review of the relevant data request responses provided in this case,
126 there has been a significant amount of detailed network information provided by the
127 CLECs. Further, a review of SBC's exhibits also shows that SBC received a significant
128 amount of information from the CLECs (and other carriers). The problem in this case is
129 not with CLEC data responses, it is that the data requested and collected by SBC does not
130 support the buildings and routes proposed by SBC for non-impairment findings. SBC's
131 failure to request the necessary data, and to accurately interpret the data received, should
132 not be held against the CLECs.

133 It appears that SBC was simply attempting to develop the most extensive list of
134 buildings and routes possible. SBC certainly had an adequate amount of information
135 from the CLECs regarding high capacity loops to perform an analysis without relying
136 upon third party sources or broad presumptions. For transport, SBC failed to ask CLECs
137 specifically whether they were providing dedicated transport on specific, identified
138 routes, and at what capacities; SBC instead chose to develop a listing of central office
139 collocations, from which it developed an inflated list of potential routes based upon its
140 connect-the-dots methodology. Essentially, SBC's discovery requests were premised on
141 its construct that a CLEC collocation in two wire centers defines a dedicated transport
142 route. CLECs should not be faulted for SBC's failure to ask the right questions. As
143 noted below, in other jurisdictions where more appropriate data has been collected, SBC
144 has designated a much more limited universe of building locations and transport routes.

145 **Q12. WOULD CLECS HAVE AN INCENTIVE TO WITHHOLD INFORMATION**
146 **FROM SBC IF THEY WERE PROVIDING SELF-PROVISIONED OR**
147 **WHOLESALE SERVICES ON A ROUTE OR TO AN ENTERPRISE**
148 **CUSTOMER LOCATION?**

149 A12. No, one would expect the opposite to be true. It is important to recognize that there are
150 actually two distinct categories of CLECs involved in this proceeding (either as
151 intervenors or as subpoena recipients): those that own their own facilities on a particular
152 route or at a particular location (the "facility owners"), and those that rely upon access to
153 the facilities of SBC and other CLECs (the "facility lessees"). The facility owners have
154 little need for unbundled network elements at these locations – because they already have
155 their own facilities installed – and their interest in this proceeding with respect to those
156 routes and locations may be minimal. The facility lessees, who depend upon the broad
157 availability of unbundled network elements, have a much greater interest in this
158 proceeding, as findings of non-impairment will directly impact their ability to provide
159 service.

160 **Q13. DR. LIU HAS SUGGESTED AT PAGE 24 OF HER LOOPS TESTIMONY THAT**
161 **THE CLECS MAY BE MORE RESPONSIVE IF THE COMMISSION USED AS**
162 **AN INCENTIVE THE THREAT OF DELISTING UNES FROM THOSE SBC IS**
163 **OBLIGATED TO OFFER. DO YOU AGREE?**

164 A13. No. The CLECs that would be harmed by such an approach would be the facilities
165 lessees, who have little relevant information to provide regarding facilities deployment.
166 In contrast, the facilities owners, who have the most information, may even benefit if
167 their competitors no longer can use SBC-provided UNEs.

168 **Q14. DOES THIS MEAN THAT FACILITIES OWNERS WILL NOT BE IMPACTED**
169 **BY THE OUTCOME OF THIS PROCEEDING?**

170 A14. No. Some of the facilities owners also lease a significant amount of loop and transport
171 equivalent services from SBC to expand the reach of their networks. These carriers

172 certainly have an interest in making sure that they have access to UNEs where they do
173 not have the capability of providing service, as well as ensuring that there is a workable
174 transitional mechanism to allow them to convert to their own facilities where possible.

175 **Q15. BY RECOMMENDING THAT THE COMMISSION MAKE A "PROVISIONAL**
176 **FINDING" OF NON-IMPAIRMENT FOR 122 BUILDINGS, DR. LIU IS**
177 **INDICATING THAT UNVALIDATED GEORESULTS DATA CAN BE USED BY**
178 **SBC AS EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE TRIGGERS ARE MET FOR**
179 **ENTERPRISE LOOPS. IS THIS APPROPRIATE?**

180 A15. No. Even if CLECs are actually providing service into a building identified by
181 GeoResults data, GeoResults does not have any information as to the nature, the capacity
182 levels, or the operational readiness of the CLEC service. GeoResults would certainly be
183 a good starting point for identifying CLECs who may be providing services, but the
184 GeoResults information must be validated, and details about the nature of the services,
185 either from the CLECs serving the building or from other independent sources, must be
186 obtained.

187 **Q16. HAVE OTHER AMERITECH STATES USED A DIFFERENT APPROACH**
188 **THAN THAT USED BY SBC ILLINOIS TO COLLECTING DATA FROM**
189 **CLECS?**

190 A16. Yes. Ohio and Wisconsin both implemented a process in which the Commission staff
191 sent a simple list of questions to the CLECs asking the locations and routes for which
192 they provide loops and dedicated transport service. For these locations and routes, the
193 CLECs were able to provide specific responses, and the result is a much more accurate
194 and manageable record. As a result of this approach, SBC requested non-impairment
195 findings for a significantly lower number of buildings and routes for Wisconsin and Ohio
196 than it did for Illinois.

197 In Ohio, for example, SBC only claimed that 19 transport routes meet the self-
198 provisioning trigger, and 28 routes meet the wholesale trigger, in contrast with the SBC
199 Illinois' claims for 127 routes (self-provisioning) and 285 routes (wholesale),
200 respectively. For Wisconsin, SBC only claimed that 19 routes meet the self-provisioning
201 trigger and that 22 routes meet the wholesale trigger. While Illinois obviously has had
202 more CLEC network deployment than these two states, a significant reason SBC
203 provided a smaller list in Ohio and Wisconsin is likely that it was forced to rely upon the
204 responses to the specific data requests which limited SBC's ability to create potential
205 "triggered" locations or routes.

206 **Q17. ON PAGE 24 OF HER LOOPS TESTIMONY, DR. LIU HAS MADE SEVERAL**
207 **RECOMMENDATIONS THAT THE COMMISSION REQUIRE SBC AND THE**
208 **OTHER PARTIES TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR**
209 **PURPOSES OF MAKING THE DETERMINATIONS REQUESTED IN THIS**
210 **PROCEEDING. WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE COMMISSION TO**
211 **USE THE APPROACHES AND QUESTIONS USED IN OHIO AND WISCONSIN**
212 **TO GATHERING THIS INFORMATION?**

213 **A17.** Yes, if the Commission decides that the additional information requested by Dr. Liu
214 should be collected, I would recommend that the Commission utilize the questions and
215 implement a data collection process similar to that employed by the Wisconsin and Ohio
216 commissions.

217 **Q18. FOR ENTERPRISE LOOP POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT, STAFF WITNESS DR.**
218 **STARANCZAK PROPOSES THAT 100 BUILDINGS SHOULD QUALIFY FOR A**
219 **POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT FINDING UNLESS CLECS CAN PROVIDE A**
220 **LOCATION-SPECIFIC REASON WHY A BUILDING DOES NOT MEET THE**
221 **TEST. IS THIS APPROPRIATE?**

222 **A18.** No. First, as I will explain in Section V of this testimony, this Staff proposal to
223 essentially accept SBC's position on potential deployment with respect to 100 buildings
224 is completely at odds with the FCC requirements. Second, the Staff's proposal to require

225 CLECs to provide information to show that the 100 buildings do not qualify for a non-
226 impairment finding under potential deployment is an impossible task, especially given the
227 timeframes in this case, and effectively shifts the burden of proof to the CLECs. Unlike
228 SBC, which is already providing service into virtually all if not every building in its
229 service territory, the CLECs will have little information as to what type of potential
230 barriers may exist related to the 100 buildings. It could very well be that many of these
231 100 buildings may not even allow CLECs to place their facilities in the building unless
232 they agree to some sort of revenue sharing arrangement, or that the buildings may not
233 have space to accommodate competitive facilities. Unless CLECs have already
234 attempted to enter the building and been rejected for some reason, it is unlikely that they
235 will have access to such information, positive or negative, about a given building. Thus,
236 the result of Staff's proposal would be that buildings for which there may be significant
237 issues concerning CLEC access would be delisted due to the inability of the CLECs to
238 obtain specific information about the buildings in the time frames available in this docket.

239 **III. SWITCHED TRANSPORT CANNOT BE INCLUDED IN THE DEDICATED**
240 **TRANSPORT TRIGGERS.**

241 **Q19. ON PAGE 49 OF HER TESTIMONY ON TRANSPORT TRIGGERS, DR. LIU**
242 **ASSERTS THAT OTHER FORMS OF CLEC-PROVIDED TRANSPORT,**
243 **INCLUDING SWITCHED TRANSPORT, SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE**
244 **TRIGGER ANALYSES FOR DEDICATED TRANSPORT. DO YOU AGREE?**

245 A19. No. The FCC provided a very specific definition of the type of CLEC transport to be
246 included in this test: dedicated transport between two ILEC wire centers. Indeed, the
247 FCC in the TRO *narrowed* the definition such that it no longer includes entrance facilities
248 – transport from an ILEC wire center back to the CLEC's facilities. As Dr. Liu
249 acknowledges in her testimony, the FCC does not include all CLEC-provided dedicated


250 transport; rather, it excludes any and all CLEC transport that does not provide a
251 connection between ILEC wire centers.

252 **Q20. IS IT POSSIBLE FOR ANY TYPE OF SWITCHED TRANSPORT**
253 **ARRANGEMENT TO MEET THE DEFINITION OF DEDICATED**
254 **TRANSPORT?**

255 A20. Absolutely not. Dedicated transport, by definition, provides a fixed path between two
256 points, in this case SBC wire centers. In paragraph 361 of the TRO, the FCC defines
257 dedicated transport as "facilities dedicated to a particular customer or competitive carrier
258 that it uses for transmission among incumbent LEC central offices and tandem offices."
259 Diagram 1 below provides a depiction of a basic CLEC network configured to provide
260 dedicated transport between ILEC wire centers.

261

Diagram 1
CLEC Dedicated Transport



262

263

264


265

266

267

If a switch is present along the “transport route,” the fixed path no longer exists, as traffic can be routed to and from points outside of the fixed path by the switch, and traffic from other customers and carriers will “share” the transport route. Diagram 2 below provides a graphic description of a typical CLEC configuration in which two CLEC wire center collocations are aggregated back to a switch.

Diagram 2
CLEC Switched Transport



268

269

270 **Q21. IF "SWITCHED TRANSPORT" IS NOT DEDICATED TRANSPORT, HOW IS**
 271 **IT PROPERLY CLASSIFIED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF NETWORK**
 272 **FUNCTION?**

273 A21. Switched transport is the same as "shared" or "common" transport. These terms all have
 274 the same meaning, and are used interchangeably when describing the functionality in
 275 ILEC and CLEC networks of providing the capability of routing traffic *between multiple*
 276 *points* via a switch. In every instance I have encountered, switched or shared transport is
 277 treated as a completely separate and distinct service from dedicated transport. For
 278 example, in SBC's access tariffs, switched transport and dedicated transport are different
 279 offerings located in different sections of the tariff and which have different applications.

280 **Q22. IN THE TRO, DOES THE FCC EVALUATE SWITCHED OR SHARED**
281 **TRANSPORT SEPARATELY FROM DEDICATED TRANSPORT?**

282 A22. Yes. In footnote 1100 of the TRO, the FCC states that "We refer generically to
283 'transport' in this Part as meaning dedicated transport. We address shared transport in
284 Part VI.E. of this Order." Indeed, shared transport is treated separately under the rules
285 adopted by the TRO. See 47 C.F.R. 51.319(d)(iii)(C). The FCC's inclusion of a separate
286 section in the TRO to evaluate shared transport plainly means that it could not have
287 intended for shared transport to be included as dedicated transport as well.

288 **Q23. HAS THIS COMMISSION PREVIOUSLY REJECTED THE NOTION THAT**
289 **DEDICATED TRANSPORT IS THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF SHARED**
290 **TRANSPORT?**

291 A23. Yes. In the Commission's February 17, 1998 Order in Docket Nos. 96-0486 & 96-0569
292 (Consolidated), in which it established UNE loop and other UNE rates for Ameritech, the
293 Commission rejected Ameritech's proposal to require CLECs wishing to utilize the UNE-
294 Platform to order dedicated transport between each and every Ameritech end office
295 switch. The Commission based its decision upon the significant operational and
296 economic differences between the two: "Moreover, the Commission finds that both of
297 Ameritech's ULT (unbundled local transport) offerings suffer from several engineering
298 and administration deficiencies. Rather than allowing for the shared use of existing
299 capacity on in-place facilities, Ameritech is recommending that CLECs design, engineer
300 and build what amount to parallel interoffice networks just to achieve interoffice
301 connection needed to allow for ubiquitous organization and termination of their
302 customers' traffic." The Commission continued: "The Commission further notes that
303 Ameritech's transport proposals would amount to prohibitively expensive transport,
304 making UNEs an undesirable entrant plan. A CLEC using Ameritech's version of

305 shared transport to provision the platform would effectively have to pay for dedicated
306 transport from each Ameritech end office – 265 in Illinois – to provision its parallel
307 network.” (*Id.*, page 106).

308 **Q24. BASED UPON YOUR EXPERIENCE, IS IT LIKELY THAT MOST OF THE**
309 **CLEC COLLOCATIONS LISTED BY SBC ARE BEING USED TO PROVIDE**
310 **DEDICATED TRANSPORT, OR SWITCHED (OR SHARED) TRANSPORT, AS**
311 **DEFINED IN THE TRO?**

312 A24. I have no doubt that they are being used to provide switched or shared transport. The
313 typical business plan for a CLEC that has entered the switched voice market is to
314 establish collocation arrangements for the primary purpose of aggregating unbundled
315 loops, and using transport facilities to connect the loop aggregation equipment to a switch
316 that is located at another location. If the switch were located at the central office, as it is
317 for SBC, the CLEC would not need any transport facilities back to the switch. This is
318 why it is critical that information be collected from the CLECs (and other carriers) that
319 would enable the Commission to exclude switched transport in its entirety from the
320 trigger analysis.

321 **Q25. DOES THE DEFINITION OF A TRANSPORT ROUTE IN THE TRO ALLOW**
322 **FOR INCLUSION OF ROUTES FOR WHICH SERVICE IS NOT CURRENTLY**
323 **BEING PROVIDED AS TRIGGERS?**

324 A25. No. In paragraph 401 of the TRO, the FCC states: “Both triggers we adopt today
325 evaluate transport on a route-specific basis. We define a route, for purposes of these
326 tests, as a connection between wire center or switch “A” and wire center or switch “Z.”
327 Even if, on the incumbent LEC’s network, a transport circuit from “A” to “Z” passes
328 through an intermediate wire center “X,” the competitive providers must offer service
329 connecting wire centers “A” and “Z,” but do not have to mirror the network path of the
330 incumbent LEC through wire center “X.”” The FCC went on to state that “[a] route-

331 specific test is sufficiently granular to avoid falsely identifying as competitive a route
332 between two offices.”

333 **Q26. DO YOU AGREE WITH DR. LIU'S ASSERTION ON PAGE 29 OF HER**
334 **TRANSPORT TESTIMONY THAT, TO THE EXTENT A CLEC HAS**
335 **PROVISIONED TRANSPORT BACK TO ITS SWITCH FROM TWO WIRE**
336 **CENTERS, THAT ROUTE MAY SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT OF**
337 **OPERATIONAL READINESS FOR DEDICATED TRANSPORT BETWEEN**
338 **THE TWO WIRE CENTERS?**

339 A26. No. This is another instance in which Staff is looking at the potential capabilities of the
340 CLEC's network instead of evidence of actual CLEC services. The assumption that any
341 two CLEC collocations at ILEC wire centers should be assumed to be endpoints of a
342 transport route is the primary basis for SBC's proposed route triggers.

343 **IV. OC(N) LEVEL SERVICES CANNOT BE INCLUDED IN THE TRIGGERS.**

344
345 **Q27. IN BOTH HER LOOP AND TRANSPORT TRIGGER TESTIMONY, DR. LIU**
346 **SUGGESTS THAT IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE TO DELIST LOCATIONS OR**
347 **ROUTES FOR WHICH CLECS HAVE ONLY DEPLOYED OC(N) LEVEL**
348 **CAPACITIES. DO YOU AGREE?**

349 A27. No. The FCC's entire impairment analysis is based upon the assumption that CLECs
350 receive enough revenue for locations where they have deployed OC(n) facilities to justify
351 the costs of extending their networks. The FCC concluded that there was no impairment
352 for OC(n) facilities, and CLECs can no longer access OC(n) facilities as UNEs. For DS3,
353 DS1, and dark fiber services, the FCC's conclusion was completely different. The FCC
354 determined that, collectively, DS3, DS1, and dark fiber loop and transport services need
355 to be treated as a separate class of services because, unlike OC(n) services, the revenues
356 associated with DS3s, DS1s, and dark fiber are *unlikely* to be sufficient to recover their
357 costs. It would be entirely inconsistent to include a class of services for which a
358 determination of non-impairment has already been reached, in this case OC(n) services,

359 for the impairment analysis of another class of services for which non-impairment is
360 unlikely.

361 **Q28. WHAT SHOWING DOES THE TRO REQUIRE AS TO THE CAPACITY LEVEL**
362 **AT WHICH CLECS ARE PROVIDING SERVICE IN ORDER TO QUALIFY**
363 **FOR THE TRIGGERS?**

364 A28. The TRO requires a showing that the CLEC is *currently* providing service at the *relevant*
365 capacity level. In Paragraph 329 of the TRO, the FCC, in introducing the loop triggers,
366 states: "We establish two different types of triggers to identify the specific customer
367 locations where there may be no impairment for the high-capacity loops we identify
368 below and the incumbent LEC unbundling obligation can be eliminated at that customer
369 location: 1) where a specific customer location is identified as *being currently served* by
370 two or more unaffiliated competitive LECs with their own loop transmission facilities *at*
371 *the relevant loop capacity level* (Self Provisioning Trigger); or 2) where two or more
372 unaffiliated competitive providers have deployed transmission facilities to the location
373 and are offering alternative loop facilities to competitive LECs on a wholesale basis *at*
374 *the same capacity level* (Competitive Wholesale Facilities Trigger)."

375 Likewise, in introducing the wholesale transport trigger, paragraph 400 of the
376 TRO provides: "Specifically, we find that competing carriers are not impaired where
377 competing carriers have available two or more alternative transport providers, not
378 affiliated with each other or the incumbent LEC, *immediately capable and willing to*
379 *provide transport at a specific capacity* along a given route between incumbent LEC
380 switches or wire centers. If a state commission finds no impairment *for a specific*
381 *capacity level* of transport on a route, the incumbent LEC will no longer be required to

382 unbundle *that transport* along that route, according to the transition schedule adopted by
383 the state commission.” (emphasis added)

384 **Q29. DOES THE TRO ANTICIPATE A RESULT WHERE IMPAIRMENT MAY BE**
385 **FOUND FOR SOME CAPACITY LEVELS BUT NOT OTHERS ALONG THE**
386 **SAME TRANSPORT ROUTE?**

387 A29. Yes. In paragraph 407 of the TRO describing the self-provisioning transport trigger, the
388 FCC states: “Furthermore, we note that where, through application of this trigger,
389 impairment for unbundled transport *at a particular capacity* is no longer found,
390 substantial competitive transport facilities, and perhaps other capacities of UNE transport
391 will be available. Therefore, if this trigger removes unbundled *transport at a particular*
392 *capacity level*, carriers will remain capable of serving end-user customers in all areas.
393 This will provide certainty for new market entrants.”

394 **Q30. DR. LIU SUGGESTS THAT OC(N) SERVICES COULD BE USED IN THE**
395 **TRIGGER ANALYSIS, BECAUSE THEY POTENTIALLY COULD BE**
396 **DEMULTIPLEXED TO DERIVE A DS3 OR DS1 LEVEL SERVICE. IS THIS**
397 **CONSISTENT WITH THE LANGUAGE FROM THE TRO YOU CITED**
398 **ABOVE?**

399 A30. No. Dr. Liu’s suggestion would essentially allow all capacity levels for a location or
400 route to be delisted if OC(n) facilities are present, which is clearly at odds with the TRO.
401 If the FCC had intended the result contemplated by Dr. Liu, instead of developing
402 capacity-specific tests, it would have simply declared no impairment for any capacity
403 level wherever OC(n) level services exists. The FCC did the exact opposite in the TRO.
404 It concluded that, on a national basis, CLECs are impaired without access to DS3 and
405 DS1 level services. I also would point out that DS0 voice grade services can also be
406 derived from an OC(n) loops, and certainly no one would suggest that a voice grade loop
407 be removed as a UNE based upon the existence of an OC(n) facility.

408 Second, it is clear that the FCC intended for the triggers to be a snapshot of the
409 services that CLECs are currently providing, and not a forward-looking analysis of the
410 potential capabilities of the CLECs' networks. The FCC recognized this distinction in its
411 development of the potential deployment analysis, which requires a full-blown
412 demonstration of both customer demand and economic viability for locations to meet this
413 test.

414 **Q31. PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY DR. LIU'S OC(N) THEORY IS NOT CONSISTENT**
415 **WITH THE RULES ADOPTED BY THE FCC IN THE TRO?**

416 A31. SBC has identified facilities for which it believes CLECs *may be capable* of, but are not
417 currently, providing service at the requisite capacity levels. Both the self-provisioning
418 and wholesale triggers require, however, that for each capacity level a demonstration be
419 made that "service is being offered" and that the carrier is "operationally ready to provide
420 service." If a CLEC has not equipped its network to provide DS3 or DS1 capacity, it
421 cannot meet either of those requirements. SBC could certainly attempt to demonstrate
422 that CLECs with OC(n) level facilities meet the true potential deployment test, but it has
423 not done so in this proceeding.

424 **Q32. IS COST THE ONLY CONSIDERATION IN DETERMINING POTENTIAL**
425 **DEPLOYMENT?**

426 A32. No. There must also be a demonstrated demand for the services. The primary reason
427 CLECs have not invested to demultiplex their traffic in most locations is that there has
428 not been the requisite customer demand to make the investment worthwhile. In addition
429 to the cost analysis required under potential deployment, a demonstration must be made
430 that the location or route has enough demand to accommodate multiple competitive
431 supply. It could very well be the case that, even if a CLEC has deployed OC(n) facilities,

432 there simply is not enough demand for individual DS1 or DS3 circuits at the location to
433 warrant the extra investment to demultiplex the traffic. In such a case, CLECs would still
434 be impaired under the FCC rules without access to the DS1 or DS3 UNEs.

435 **V. BUILDING ACCESS AND LOOP ISSUES.**

436 **Q33. DR. LIU ASSERTS THAT SELF-PROVISIONERS NEED NOT HAVE ACCESS**
437 **TO THE ENTIRE BUILDING IN ORDER FOR THAT BUILDING TO SATISFY**
438 **THE SELF-PROVISIONING TRIGGER FOR LOOPS. DO YOU AGREE?**

439 A33. No. While the terms "building" and "customer location" have been used somewhat
440 interchangeably in the discussion of the triggers, the clear intent of the FCC's impairment
441 tests is to identify locations where customers actually have the ability to be served by
442 multiple providers. If a CLEC can only reach a single customer in a multi-tenant
443 building, the other customers in that building are unable to be served by that CLEC
444 unless the CLEC is able to reconfigure its network and gain access to the common house
445 and riser cables into the building. The individual customer location within the building
446 may be used for the triggers in that instance, but not the entire building.

447 **Q34. DR. LIU STATES THAT, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT CLECS HAVE ACCESS**
448 **TO THE ENTIRE BUILDING, IT NEED NOT BE SHOWN THAT THEY HAVE**
449 **ACCESS TO THE SAME HOUSE AND RISER CABLE THAT SBC HAS**
450 **ACCESS TO. DO YOU AGREE?**

451 A34. As a purely theoretical matter, if the CLECs truly have access to the entire building
452 through facilities other than those provided to SBC, then Dr. Liu is correct that CLECs
453 would not be disadvantaged. However, as a practical matter, I am not aware of any
454 situations where this type of arrangement exists (and Dr. Liu does not mention any), and
455 to the extent SBC makes an assertion that an individual building has such an
456 arrangement, that arrangement would need to be verified. For example, for any building
457 that was constructed before the presence of competitive providers, there would have been

458 no reason to include alternative house and riser cable for carriers other than SBC, as there
459 were no such carriers then in existence.

460 **Q35. ON PAGE 30 OF HER TESTIMONY, DR. LIU DISAGREES WITH YOUR**
461 **ASSERTION THAT COMPETITORS MUST BE ABLE TO ACCESS**
462 **WHOLESALE LOOPS AT AN ILEC WIRE CENTER. WHY IS THIS A**
463 **NECESSARY REQUIREMENT?**

464 A35. A fundamental requirement for the wholesale triggers is that the service be widely
465 available and on a nondiscriminatory basis. To access ILEC loops, CLECs have
466 established wire center collocation arrangements because wire centers are the aggregation
467 point for loops on the ILEC networks. If wholesale loops from another CLEC were not
468 available at the wire center, then the CLECs would need to incur additional cost to extend
469 their networks to wherever the wholesale loops were made available. In addition to
470 placing an additional and unnecessary cost burden upon the CLECs, this type of
471 arrangement would only be available to CLECs with the means to extend their networks
472 to the wholesaler, meaning that the wholesale service does not meet either the
473 requirement of being widely available or nondiscriminatory.

474 **VI. STAFF'S POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT PROPOSAL FOR LOOPS DOES NOT**
475 **CURE THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS OF SBC'S APPROACH.**

476 **Q36. STAFF WITNESS DR. STARANCZAK PROPOSED THAT A MODIFIED**
477 **VERSION OF SBC'S POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT ANALYSIS FOR LOOPS BE**
478 **ADOPTED. DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS PROPOSAL?**

479 A36. No. As I described in my direct testimony, SBC's potential deployment analysis is not
480 building or location-specific. Instead of analyzing each building and location for its
481 individual demand, access, and cost characteristics, as required by the TRO, SBC's
482 analysis simply groups a large number of buildings together, and assumes they are all
483 identical. Staff's proposal merely adjusts two of the assumptions in SBC's analysis – the

484 annual revenue threshold and the number of adjacent CLEC networks – to narrow the
485 number of buildings from 749 to 100. Further, Staff accepts SBC's assumption that any
486 building located within 300 feet of alternative fiber facilities can be served by multiple
487 competitors, without considering or requiring any analysis of the costs and difficulties
488 associated with extending fiber facilities the necessary distance to each building. Thus,
489 the Staff's approach is really not any more granular (and therefore not any more valid)
490 than SBC's approach.

491 **Q37. IS DR. STARANCZAK'S PROPOSAL ESSENTIALLY TO ADOPT THE SBC**
492 **PROPOSAL FOR THESE 100 BUILDINGS AT ODDS WITH THE**
493 **CONCLUSIONS OF STAFF WITNESS HANSEN?**

494 A37. Yes. Mr. Hansen concluded that the underlying cost information provided by SBC is
495 insufficient for the potential deployment test. Specifically, he rejects the TELRIC
496 information provided as being incomplete by SBC's own admission, and rejects the
497 Cambridge model as not reflecting the costs relevant to the buildings proposed. As the
498 Staff has concluded that there is no relevant cost information that meets the FCC
499 requirements for potential deployment, it is unclear how the Staff can suggest that any
500 buildings meet the potential deployment test absent the filing of new, building-specific
501 cost analyses by SBC. SBC acknowledges that at least 5 of the 9 FCC requirements
502 require cost support, and therefore without sufficient cost information, it simply cannot
503 satisfy the potential deployment test.

504 **Q38. IS THE STAFF'S USE OF A BUILDING'S ANNUAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS**
505 **SPENDING AN APPROPRIATE MEANS OF IDENTIFYING BUILDINGS THAT**
506 **SHOULD BE DELISTED?**

507 A38. No. As I explained in my direct testimony, a building's total annual revenue is not the
508 best indicator of whether sufficient demand exists for DS3 or dark fiber services. A large

509 building with numerous customers could easily surpass Staff's \$150,000 threshold
510 without having sufficient demand for DS3 or dark fiber. A much better indicator would
511 be for SBC to identify those buildings for which it is providing significant quantities of
512 DS3 and dark fiber services, irrespective of the total telecommunications spending at the
513 building.

514 **Q39. IS THE \$150,000 THRESHOLD RECOMMENDED BY SPRINT WITNESS**
515 **GORDON A BY-PRODUCT OF THE CAMBRIDGE MODEL, WHICH STAFF**
516 **WITNESS HANSEN HAS REJECTED?**

517 A39. Yes. First, I certainly agree with Sprint witness Gordon's conclusion that SBC's
518 assumption to use total building estimated revenues is inappropriate, and to the extent
519 that a building-revenue threshold is adopted, it must be adjusted to reflect multiple,
520 competitive supply. It must be remembered, however, that the \$50,000 threshold that
521 provides the basis of Sprint witness Gordon's recommendation is SBC's original
522 proposal. As that proposal was based upon the Cambridge model, and the Staff has
523 rejected the Cambridge model, it would make sense that any new proposal based upon
524 the Cambridge model's outputs should also be rejected. To the extent that a revenue-
525 based approach is adopted, the underlying assumption should also be adjusted to reflect
526 the revenues for buildings that have a sufficient demand for DS3 and dark fiber services,
527 which I believe will be a much smaller set of buildings.

528 **Q40. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

529 A40. Yes.